Students will the articles and comment on their thoughts as well as articulate and discuss how points made in the historic article are relevant to current business practices. Students will be required to provide examples of current practices (of their employer ideally) and how these relate to the points made in one of the historic (dated) articles
« How can management be tough-minded as to rising costs, flexible as to changing con- ditions, resourceful as to future planning?
Breakeven Point Control
for Higher Profits By Fred V. Gardner
When sales mount, as they have for many firms since World War II, costs generally go up too. But whfen sales level off and decline, as they are begiiiining or threatening to do in many product lines and divisions of even the most prosperous companies today, costs do not follow quite so easily. No matter how much costs should go down as sales drop, in fact they hardly ever bebave that way.
The reasons for this are clear. A period dur- ing which sales are easy to come by leads to lackadaisical cost control and an undermining of the profit motive. Sheer volume makes the company loolt good, and top executives do not pay enough cjritical, discerning attention to the attitudes of junior executives, to planning and forecasting, dr to productive efficiency. In ad- dition costs have become far less flexible as a result of involved government regulations and restrictive labor contracts, as a result of the ponderousnesB of modem line-staff organiza- tion, and as a result of just plain physical factors like added space (the distance from the front door to the back door of the plant is far greater today than it!used to be).
Consequently, executives run into great diffi- culty when, ^s volume shows signs of slipping, they try to get costs in line with sales. They see clearly that i( 70 cents in costs were added for each dollar of increased volume during the ex- pansion years, 70 cents must be removed for
each dollar of lost sales, or the breakeven point will climb to a dangerous level. But how can management instill cost-consciousness in young- er executives who have never experienced the problems involved in coping with falling vol- umes, educate them to take a more critical look at some of those costs that have come to be re- garded (however wrongly) as “fixed”? What can be done about excessive costs due to slow- moving inventories and other such causes? And is it not true that in order to take away some of a competitor’s business, the company must reduce prices, thus raising the breakeven point still further?
It may be well-nigh impossible, when busi- ness slips, to reduce costs at rates comparable to increases in costs when business goes up. But it is possible to take a far tougher attitude toward costs than most managements do today. I am not thinking of the kind of excited, panicky pressure from above to “cut costs — anywhere” that all too often has characterized manage- ment’s approach in the past; that may do more harm than good. Rather, I am thinking of the tough-minded, hard-headed “figure approach” that (a) pinpoints causes of trouble as they develop, not aft-erward; (b) shows clearly and forcefully the effect that poor performance in any division, department, or shop has on the over-all company breakeven point; and (c) “puts the bee” on executives to move on their own initiative when costs get out of line, regardless of whether there is pressure from the top and
124 Harvard Business Review
regardless of whether profits are rising or falling. In this article I shall discuss the working of
this approach, which I call “breakeven point control.” Let us begin by considering briefly the need for breakeven point control as opposed to conventional accounting; then turn to a de- tailed step-by-step analysis of how and why it works, relying not on generalities but on specific figures and a concrete case situation.
Need for Flexible Control
In planning the attack on costs, management should remember that cost control problems arise, in the main, because of the fact that ex- ecutives must plan ahead in time, that they “deal in futures.”
Tbis is so obvious that we are likely to over- look its implications. If all inventory, expendi- ture, financing, depreciation, investment, and other problems had time sequences of only one moment, say, or one month, the difficulties of management would be minimized. But, unfor- tunately, the cost decisions that come to man- agement range from those which can be made every day on the basis of volume fluctuations (for example, the number of salesmen to send out to sell a line of merchandise) to those re- quiring planning over an extended depreciation period (for example, an investment in machines which are capable of producing products now only on the drawing boards).
It is because of the importance of the time or “turnover” factor that policy makers often find accounting so frustrating. Conventional accounting is an exacting science. It reports in terms of static conditions, usually after the fact. It reckons that the company made a given per- centage of profit for a given period of time on a given volume. All this is fine, but it does not account for the dynamic factors. And it does not account for the fact that some cost items repeat themselves faster than others, that some machines are used up faster than others, that some inventories turn over faster than others. Accordingly, accounting often has very hmited helpfulness to management in terms of where actually to turn in order to control costs.
Tbe Breakeven Point By contrast, the breakeven point
mon term in business parlance but not an “accounting” term — does reflect the dynamic factors which affect profits.
A business has a breakeven point because of different rates of turnover and activity. If all costs varied directly with volume, there would be no breakeven point; the company would make money on the first $i,ooo of sales. On the other hand, if all costs were more or less constant (which they are not), the breakeven point would be static, not moving (which it is), and cost control would be a pretty cut-and-dried business. But the company has both standby and variable costs, and it is because of this that there is a breakeven point. (To me the term fixed cost is very unsatisfactory, because no cost is really fixed; ^ I prefer to label expenditures that continue regardless of production level as standby costs.) It is also because of the dual nature of costs that the constructive way for management to think about profits is not in terms of the usual formula Profits = Sales — Costs, but in terms of the formula Profits = Sales — [Standby — Variable Costs].
Even though many managements purport to know their breakeven points, they usually know them only in a superficial, haphazard way. They know them in terms of static, “account- ing” costs and generalities like “Our costs are x dollars, so we will have to have y dollars in sales to get them back,” instead of specific, variable costs. They cannot put breakeven points to their really important use, which is for budgeting, forecasting, and controlling costs.
A breakeven point moves witb changing con- ditions (e.g., fluctuations in sales or in procure- ment costs) and, in moving, flashes a warning. If management does not heed that warning and follow through with appropriate action, the annual budget and the forecasts on which it is based soon become obsolete for all practical purposes — especially in years of great eco- nomic change when they are most needed. No wonder many executives say, “Budgets! I don’t want them. They just confuse me.” *
Once the breakeven idea is integrated into control thinking, then it is comparatively easy to compare the past with the present, and both with the future. Present forecasting methods too often are unsatisfactory because it is hard to visualize plans in terms of the actualities of the past, especially when the volume forecasted is different from immediate past experiences. The breakeven approach sharpens the effective-
^ See, for example, Bruce Payne, “A Program for Cost Reduction,” HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, September- October 1953, p. 71.
ness of forec|asting because the projected figures can be muclj more intensively analyzed in rela- tion to what! has happened or is happening.
System in Operation
Now let us turn to the actual operation of breakeven point control. As a concrete basis for discussion, take the case of the “Wisconsin Manufacturing Company” (disguised name). Its situation is representative of that in which many divisions of medium-size and large com- panies and also many whole small companies find themselves today. Let us suppose that the management of the Wisconsin Manufacturing Company, faiced with the necessity of preparing for rougher weather in competition, turns to breakeven point control. How will manage- ment go abojit drawing up a budget, making an analysis, and deciding what action to take?
Control Data Needed
To begin, management needs to have certain kinds of control information. The list might be developed as follows:
1. Breakeven factors — These are the difEer- ent standby ind variable costs, from direct labor to administrative expense, as computed by the ac- countants. Although the exact breakdown will vary from company to company, two general rules are important:
(a) In some cases, a total cost will need to be divided into its standby and variable components. For example,; the total annual figure for factory overhead may be $620,700. But part of this cost is a variable depending on the number of shifts, on volume ot production, and so forth. The ac- countants need to isolate the standby portion and record it separately. When this is done for Wis- consin, the standby element comes to $294,000 and the variable to $326,700.
(b) The standby cost can be entered on the budget as a yearly figure. But the variable cost should be entered as a control figure per $100 of forecasted net sales. For example, since Wiscon- sin’s net sales forecast is $2,700,000, the variable cost for factory overhead would be listed as $12.10 per $100.
2. Breakeven performance figures — These are the yardstick figures to be used in judging the pro- posed budgets! of department heads. They are com- puted by simjple arithmetic on the basis of the breakeven faqtors and the sales forecast. For ex- ample, Wiscoiisin’s direct labor cost of $10.80 per $100 of net iales produces a budget allowance of $291,600 fori a sales forecast of $2,700,000.
Breakeven Point Control 125 It needs to be emphasized, of course, that man-
agement should not regard these yardsticks as final. For instance, the figure of $10.80 for direct labor cost may refiect inefficiency in the shop. It is used simply because it is the best available cost figure based on past performance. As performance is improved in the future, it will change.
3. Departmental budget requests — These are the budget figures submitted for management ap- proval by the department heads. They will be compared with the breakeven performance figures.
4. Percentage comparisons — These are the control figures indicating how the breakeven per- formance figures compare with the proposed de- partmental budgets. They are best expressed in percentages, the former divided by the latter. The lower the percentage, the more unfavorable the eontrol figure.
5. Breakeven points in net sales — The break- even points are obtained by dividing total standby costs by the profit pickup (see bottom line of EX- HIBIT i). They are key figures for top management because they point up the soimdness or unsound- ness of the cumulative departmental budget re- quests. To illustrate, with breakeven perfonnance Wisconsin Manufacturing Company will be mak- ing money for the stockholders once sales have passed the $2,112,600 mark; under the budget schedule proposed by the department heads, by contrast, tfie company will not be over the hump until sales pass the $2,670,600 mark, which puts the company in a precarious position if sales fall below expectations.
When these different groups of figures are obtained, they can be listed in some such form as EXHIBIT I, which shows the breakeven point analysis of the proposed departmental budgets for Wisconsin Manufacturing Company.
Interpretation of Analysis
Now, what does this analysis tell manage- ment? From it, top executives can see at a glance that the greatest relative increases in proposed costs lie in administrative expense and factory overhead, the next greatest in selling expense, and the next in prime material. (The largest increases doUarwise are, of course, in factory overhead and prime material; on this basis, the jump in selling expense does not show up as being as significant as it is, at least from the standpoint of corrective management action.)
Top management’s interpretation of the soft spots in the cost picture is not distorted by volumes. Using an objective, readily agreed-on frame of reference, management can discuss budget proposals with the different department
126 Harvard Business Review
heads. There can be a better meeting of the minds on what to do and why to do it. For instance, let us suppose that we are in the shoes of Wisconsin’s management. We might find ourselves thinking this way:
After reviewing overhead practices and overhead organization as the first step in finding opportu- nities to reduce excesses in factory overhead, fac- tory management tells us that overhead increases have come about largely as a result of fringe bene- fits for labor. Do we take it lying down? On the contrary; our engineering and methods men can
computations and find out what items account for the variation between breakeven performance and the budget request. Any item taken by itself may seem small, but that is no reason for overlooking it. It is much easier to coordinate the thinking of de- partment heads, and to impress them with the corrosive action on profits, when eost excesses are as small as 3% or 4%.
Alternative Courses of Action Of course, it may be found that the cost in-
creases are not all related to departmental per- formance. For example, the profit deterioration
EXHIBIT I. BREAKEVEN POINT ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED DEPARTMENTAL BUDGETS, WISCONSIN MANUFACTURING COMPANY
Net sales Cost of sales
Direct labor Prime material Factory overhead
Total Gross Profits Expense
Total Total costs Net profit (before taxes) Breakeven point in net
sales for the year* Profit pickupt
Breakeven factors Standby costs
Variable costs per $100 net sales
$10.Bo 46.80 12.10
$ 7-27 0.38
$ 7.65 $77.35
$ 291,600 1,263,600
$ 296,290 94,760
$ 291,600 1,296,044
$ 310,953 106,267
9 7 % 9 0 %
9 5 % 89%
9 5 %
* Breakeven point is calculated by dividing total standby costs by profit pickup; since the control figure indicates 95% realization, total standby costs must be adjusted accordingly ($478,500 -^ 95%) before breakeven point is found for departmental budget requests.
t Profit pickup represents difference between $100 and total variable cost per $100 net sales (adjusted by control figure if called for).
push for elimination of prime labor costs and for greater mechanization; the whole bag of tricks used to accomplish cost reduction can be brought into play. *
Selling and administrative cost increases cannot be allowed to go scot-free, if only for the psycho- logieal effect on the rest of the organization. It may be that we are getting “fancy” in these depart- ments, or have added things “nice to have.” There must be assurance that value for the money will be realized in a better competitive position or in future returns which cannot be expected to be realized in the forecasted period. Even so, such an assur- ance for the future is not an alibi for taking it easy now. How much can we recover with less costly paper work? What can we drop to make up for the additions we cannot or should not avoid?
We decide to go to the standby and variable cost
may be attributable to a change in the mix of products from long-margin to short-margin lines (a situation which I shall discuss in detail later) or to fundamental changes in the business. Such findings call for real exercise of that art called “management.” The top executives of Wis- consin Manufacturing Company will need to look cold-bloodedly at the risks involved and reach a positive decision. That decision may call for anything from cautious acceptance to highly aggressive action. Here are some of the specific ways in which top management thinking might react to the breakeven point analysis:
C “We must challenge ourselves to no longer accept budget estimates on the grounds that ‘our department heads know what they are about or
they wouldn’t Ibe where they are.’ Though this attitude is harji to pin down, it is none the less positive in its effect on the breakeven point and on profits. We â e letting the breakeven point rise nearly to our jjrobable volume. Can we be sound and do so?”
C “Our original breakeven point of $2,112,600 is 78% of the forecasted volume of $2,700,000. In the probabU economic weather this is the mini- mum margin of safety. Hence we must instruct department hqads that the old breakeven point must be maintained and no expense which can be eliminated or deferred can remain in their plans, for the projected breakeven point is excessive.”
C “We are now forced to pay the piper for neglect in prior years. The excesses will be ac- cepted only to the extent that they are temporary. Immediately vf.e ‘build fences’ around the tempo- rary excesses -^ as variable excesses over the old breakeven point, as projects to be accounted for. The time zoning of the projects is scheduled, the progress checked, and clear understanding estab- lished that when the project is completed or proved ineffective, the cost must be eliminated. The tem- porary rise in jthe breakeven point is thus insured as much as possible against becoming other than temporary.”
(Incidentally, this is probably the toughest type of action to carry through |p a successful conclu- sion but a very effective method in breakeven con- trol. It is also an appropriate course following a management C(i)nclusion that “the planned excesses are good risks f|or greater gains in the future.”)
C “The perjformance excesses are not true ex- cesses at all, but rather an increase in organization capacity; and rwe have already invested in some training. To pay for these excesses and to main- tain the same relative breakeven point, sales volume must be forced; upward to $3,450,000 (where the profits on the revised breakeven point will equal the profits on the old breakeven point) without added capital !expenditure. The challenge is to our sales department. Can our sales department show us that it can get $750,000 of volume above its original forecast without capital plant expendi- ture and without shortening the margin on any of our products?”
€ “None of these actions can be the sole an- swer, and we must employ different approaches in combination. For instance, half the excess we ac- cept, and half;must be made good by extra sales volume. Or, vî e accept half the projects if addi- tional volume cjan be found to cover the rest of the excesses. In aijiy event, we predicate all our deci- sions on answers to such questions as: Do our plans maintain! the same relative (not necessarily the same absoliite) breakeven point? Does the re-
Breakeven Point Control 127
sultant variable profit pickup rate represent nearly the same profit above the breakeven point? Will the realizable profits be an adequate return on capital employed and on all the extra work and risks we must undertake?”
In practice, the forecasts on which the break- even point analysis is based will need to be re- vised from time to time. One of the beauties of breakeven point control is that it lends itself easily to management’s needs for fresh plan- ning when unexpected situations occur. Using Wisconsin Manufacturing Company again as a case example, let us tum now to three such situations and examine their implications in terms of the company’s profit outlook. What happens to the breakeven point if the company gets $2,700,000 sales as forecasted, but there is a greater proportion of sales for low-margin products than expected? What happens if the forecasted volume does not materialize? What is the effect of performance failures on the part of operating departments?
Less Profitable Sales
In a business or division of a business having three product lines, there may be one with a normal 10% gross margin, another with a nor- mal 20% gross margin, and still another with a normal 30% gross margin. Past experience may indicate or management may plan that each product line should make up, say, one-third of total sales volume. With such a product mix, the average gross margin for the company would be 20%. In one month, however, the 30% line may make up 50% of the total business; in another month the same line may make up but 10% of the total. Such swings in sales can extinguish profits or handsomely augment prof- its even though total billings remain constant. Unless isolated and measured, changes in the sales mixture confuse profit control and under- standing. To. illustrate:
As previously indicated, the 12-month sales forecast for the Wisconsin Manufacturing Com- pany is $2,700,000. Broken down by product lines the forecast is $1,215,000 for Product A, $675,000 for Product B, and $810,000 for Prod- uct C. Suppose that during the forecasted period the total sales do not change materially but sales of Products A and C are reversed, thereby increas- ing the total variable cost from $77.35 per $100
128 Harvard Business Review to $78.14 per $100. What difference will this make in the calculations of profits and the break- even point?
The increase of the variable cost amounts to $0.79 per $100 of sales. On the basis of $2,700,- 000 sales per year, the resulting loss of profits would be $21,330 ($2,700,000 X $0.79 per $100). This loss increases the breakeven point from $2,r r2,6oo net sales per year to $2,188,900 ($478,500 -^ $21.86 per $100).
As every policy-making executive realizes, volume plays a tremendous part in profit mak- ing; at the same time, executives often fail to
— rises and falls — with volume. He is always on notice when curtailment is necessary or ex- pansion is reasonable. Responsibility for man- aging his share of the business is fixed and de- fined in terms of cost dollars in advance of the change. Because of this, tbere is less of that arbitrary nature of pressure from above wbich leads to human relations difficulties.
To illustrate the effect of volume changes on a variable budget, let us suppose that the sales forecast for the Wisconsin Manufacturing Com- pany has to be revised downward to $2,400,000 (with the same proportionate drops for Products A, B, and C). The implications for costs and profits might be summarized as in EXHIBIT II.
EXHIBIT II . SUMMARY OF EFFECTS UNDER REVISED SALES FORECAST, WISCONSIN MANUFACTURING COMPANY
Product A product B Product C Total
Revised projected sales $1,080,000 Percentage of sales to total 4 5 % Variable costs per $100
net sales $79-37 Total costs
(including standby) $1,019,936 Profit (-h) or loss ( – )
before taxes -I- $60,064
2 5 %
3 0 %
take changes in volume fully into account when looking at fiuctuations in tbe rate of profit. To management a 16% profit rate may seem fabu- lous when compared with the rate in past years — because the lower volumes of past years are partly overlooked. In evaluating a rate of profit, more attention needs to be focused on the effi- ciency of operations producing it. Would rea- sonably efficient operations have produced a 10% rate or a 30% rate? This is the important question.
If top management will take this “tougher” point of view toward profits, it will find that tbe conventional system of budgeting offers at best a very inadequate method of keeping the company organization responsive to changes in sales volume. Under a static forecast the im- pulse for a reduction of spending rates must come from the top, because each department head takes his static expense forecast as a license independent of volume declines. If volume in- creases, he knows that be can always “get more money.”
By contrast, the variable allowance in each department head’s budget automatically breathes
The newly projected profit of $65,232 shown above represents a drop of $67,818 from the projected profit for $2,700,000 sales shown in EXHIBIT I. (TO check this figure, merely multi- ply the reduction in sales by the profit pickup per $100 of sales: $300,000 X $22.65 per $100 – $67,950.) Even then, management must re- duce variable costs by more than $232,000 (ob- tained by multiplying the decline in sales of $300,000 by the variable cost figure of $77.35 per $100 of sales), or the decline will be sharper. The new budget indicates exactly what the ex- ecutives in charge of Products A, B, and C respectively must do if this cost reduction goal is to be achieved.
Measuring Performance The new budget will obviously be of no avail
unless top management follows through with ad- ministrative action. When actual costs go above budgeted costs — when performance does not measure up — management must trace the vari- ations to the operating departments where cor- rections can be made. It can use the breakeven analysis as an effective educational device in
helping depai-tment executives to understand the company’s! point of view. To illustrate:
The standbjt and variable allowance for the fac- tory is budgeted at $49,392 per month, but sup- pose that in the first month the factory actually spends $54,146. Its 91% realization of break- even performance thus accounts for an increase of $4,754 in costs.
What effect does this variation have on the company’s breakeven point? Management can let the factory suplerintendent and his assistants figure it out for themselves: The forecasted pickup in
EXHIBIT HI. SUMMARY OF ALL VARIATIONS FROM FORECAST QN PROFIT AND LOSS STATEMENT, WISCONSIN MANUFACTURING COMPANY
Sales Product A : Product B Product C
Total : Forecasted costs of sales
Labor – Material Overhead
Total Actual sales less fore-
casted costs Variations from fore-
casted costs Material price variation ‘. Freight variatiian Underabsorbed overhead
Due to volume” Due to 91 % realization
of breakeven performance
Loss due to mixt Total
Total actual cost of salesj Gross profit Increase in fofecasted
$ 87,300.00 99,700.00 58,000.00
% 24,^04,60 98,584.50 51,781.90
$ 1,075.50 117.50
$ 90,606.00 92,258.00 42,750.00
* Since volume was lower than forecasted, productivity was also lower with a resulting increase in cost.
t The actual distribution of sales among products dif- fered from, the forecast.
X Total forecasted costs of sales plus total costs of varia- tions from forecasted costs.
§ Loss of profits of $10,365.12 -f- profit picltup of $22.65 per $100 net sales.
profits above the breakeven point in the company is $22.65 ps^ ^100 of net sales. Since the costs are in excess of (he breakeven allowance by $4,754, as determined ijy the standby and variable factors, it would take $21,000 more monthly sales to break even than the e3(:isting budget calls for. On a yearly basis this means that the annual breakeven point
Breakeven Point Control 129
of the company would be raised from $2,112,600 net sales to $2,364,600. By this method is a fore- cast watched, controlled, and evaluated as the costs, profit, and breakeven point planned become a reality.
Other divisions of the company, of course, will exceed (and undercut) their budgets, too. The variations can be recorded in summary form, together witb sales results, on the profit and loss statement to show the cumulative ef- fect on the breakeven point and on net profits, as in EXHIBIT HI.
Onee decision-making executives understand breakeven point control, they will find that the difficulty they have had in the past of separating out the effects of time factors and variable ele- ments of eost will diminish. No longer will they be uncomfortable or mute, because they will understand how simply performance, volume, and change of mix can be unwoven from the fabric of an over-all profit and loss statement. They will also find that they can use breakevens further to challenge nearly any dollar-and-cents decision that afFects the question of profits. For example:
€ If capital requirements are broken down into their standby and variable components in the same manner as production costs, and if proposed capi- tal expenditures are viewed in terms of the changes they produce in the breakeven point, management can make decisions as to where to spend money in order to reduce costs on a strictly scientific, cold- blooded basis.
«Proposed changes in selling prices can be quickly read in terms of their efEects on tbe break- even point, thus enabling management to deter- mine in a few minutes how much business must be added or can be sacrificed to maintain existing profits.
« Breakeven point analysis is also useful in making valid comparisons of the company’s per- formance with that of competitors. Such compari- sons are difficult to make under static methods of accounting as refiected in the profit and loss state- ment; but once management knows its own break- even points, it can readily determine comparable breakeven points for any competitor who publishes a financial report.
Thus, in many ways can breakeven point con- trol furnish clues to good or bad cost perform-
130 Harvard Business Review
ance. In each case, the problem is eventually one of segregating the good results from tbe bad by measuring from an approved point just where it is that the forecasted sales rise above the forecasted costs.
Naturally management will need to look be- neath the figures, for poor departmental per- formance can distort breakeven plans. Where to start to correct a disintegrating breakeven point is often debatable and depends on the viewpoint; it becomes a matter of “Wbich comes first, the chicken or the egg?” Are the figures off, or performance — or both? Yet the basic principles and philosophy of breakeven point control are helpful even with this problem; they can “haul themselves up by their own boot- straps.” They enable executives to be just a little more discerning in fighting an old and constant problem, because budget plans are
anchored to one set of conditions and analyses are not distorted by changing volumes.
Breakeven point control not only contributes to a more penetrating understanding of manage- ment problems, but leads to the development of a faster-moving, more aggressive executive team. When incoming figures refiecting departmental performance have direct, clear implications in terms of profits, management is more inclined to get “tough-minded,” to hunt vigorously for ways to improve performance, and to flush out the problems that lie hidden in the brush of easy times. And when the incoming figures have im- mediate significance, when it is not necessary to “wait and see” what they mean, there is every incentive for executives to be on their feet using foresight rather than in tbeir seats using hind- sight. Management can move — and move fast — as things happen, not after.
C Readers may be interested to know that the HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW has published a number of leading articles on other aspects of management control:
Chris Argyris, Human Problems with Budgets (January-February 1953) John BichaidCmley, A Tool for Management Control (Maxch 1951) Arnold F. Emch, Control Means Action (July-August 1954) William T. Jerome III, Internal Auditing as an Aid to Management (March-April 1953} James L. Peirce, The Budget Comes of Age (May-Jime 1954) Raymond Villers, Control and Freedom in a Decentralized Company (March-April
C A complete set of reprints of the above articles, plus the one in this issue by Mr. Gardner, can be obtained for $2.00 from Reprint Department, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, Boston 63, Mass. Please specify the “Control Series.”
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